Bastiat's Broken Window Error
by Dan Sullivan
Bastiat's bias
Bastiat did acknowledge that land is not property in the
sense that labor products are property. Yet in his debates with
people he viewed as socialists, he seems to have lost this recognition
and to have overstated his case against them, making
the same mistake that many neolibertarians make today - that of
ignoring the impact of land titles and other privileges on the economic
dynamics of a
community.
His Broken Window Fallacy
Failure to appreciate the economic Law of Rent, or to recognize
that interferences with the natural laws of distribution spawn
interferences with production, leads one to
conclusions that seem to make perfect sense, but which don't reconcile
with reality. An example of this is in Bastiat's essay, "What
is Seen and Not Seen," often referred to as "The
Broken-Window
Fallacy."
Bastiat offers an example of a typical French citizen "James
Goodfellow" (the literal English translation of "Jacques Bonhomme," a
symbolic French name similar to "John Bull" in England or
"Joe Sixpack" in the United States), who is furious that his
window has been broken by his son. Onlookers say, "It's an ill
wind that blows nobody some good. Such accidents keep industry going.
Everybody has to make a living. What would become of the glaziers if no
one ever broke a window?"
Bastiat then argues that work does not enrich the people
unless it is productive work, that breaking a window provides
employment for the window glazier, but that, if not for the expense of
the window, Goodfellow would have spent the same money elsewhere and
thereby
employed someone else. Bastiat argues further that breaking and fixing
a window fails to increase
wealth, and therefore fails to enrich people in the aggregate. After
all, the window that exists after the repair is no greater than the
window that existed before the window had been broken. Breaking a
window and then fixing it represents nothing more than wasted effort, a
statement that is obviously true.
However, Bastiat goes on to say that this example "is exactly the same as
that which, unfortunately, underlies most of our economic
institutions." [emphasis added] Bastiat assumes that he sees what other
economists fail to see, and does not entertain the possibility that
they see something he
fails to see - namely that his example is not so exactly similar
after all.
His explicit targets are a protectionist newspaper, and a
government official who, according to Bastiat, "has calculated with
such precision what industry would gain from the burning of Paris,
because of the houses that would have to be rebuilt." Although
protectionism is problematic for other reasons, Bastiat's analysis is
none the less flawed.
As Bastiat extrapolates to criticize his adversaries, he
presumes that "Jacques Bonhomme," is representative of all
taxpayers - that they are all typical people who will spend their money
on other labor products if that money is not taken in needless
taxes or spent on needlessly broken windows.
Yet we see cities (including Paris) becoming prosperous after being
looted, sacked and burned in wars, and, most
tellingly, cities becoming prosperous after wars their
countries had lost and wars of dubious outcomes,
with or without the interjection of "foreign aid." (There is reason to
believe that they recover more
quickly without aid, but that is a matter for
another article.) Avoiding the complexities of war economics, we can
also see that San Francisco was much more prosperous five
years after
the great earthquake of 1906 than one year before it, and
that Chicago
was similarly much more prosperous for decades after the Great Chicago
Fire than before the fire. So was Johnstown, Pennsylvania more
prosperous within a few years after the great flood and other cities
more prosperous shortly after major calamities. Thus, what is
"obviously true" in theory does not fit the evidence.
How can these examples be reconciled with the
broken-window fallacy? After all,
aren't earthquakes, fires, floods and wars essentially window-breaking
on a grand
scale? Let us look at the broken-window fallacy again, in the context
of privileges playing out on the Law of Rent. If we
assume that the broken window had been owned by a person who lived from
earnings and spent those earnings on labor products, as
Bastiat has implied, the gain to one worker, the glazier, would be
completely offset by the
loss from another. The relationship between the return to land and the
return to labor is not affected in a significant way, except that
effort is expended non-productively.
Bastiat summarizes his position as follows: "Now, if James
Goodfellow is part of society, we must conclude that society,
considering its labors and its enjoyments, has lost the value of the
broken window. "
But what if it is a large landlord's window? Are we to presume that
landlords and tenants are part of a single, classless society? That
there is not a society of rent takers with one community of interests
and a society of rent payers with other interests?
Let us suppose a town with a few landlords and many tenants. (There
might also be any number of owner-occupants, but that is irrelevant to
the illustration I am making.) These few landlords collect rent from
the tenants, and the tenants can only get that money back by providing
service. That is, they must either serve the landlords or serve others
who serve the landlords. If the landlords are only desirous of so much
service, using the rest of their revenues to buy up more land, the
reduction in the supply of money circulating among the landless allows
only so many
working people to be employed, the rest facing idleness and eviction.
While some work is meaningless and non-productive, such as breaking a
window in order to repair it, so is idleness non-productive. The
difference is that the non-productive work of repairing a
landlord's window can stave off eviction.
Meanwhile,
as the landlords apply their rent revenues (beyond what they reserve to
spend on service), to bidding against one another for land, land prices
rise, land
ownership becomes more concentrated and, in all likelihood, rents will
increase. However, even if rents do not increase, concentrating land
ownership means that rent revenues will be shared among fewer
landlords, and fewer services will be subsequently demanded by the
landlords.
But were someone to go around breaking the windows of landlords,
there would be a greater demand, not only for glaziers, but for
policemen, until that person was caught. None
of that demand is productive, in Bastiat's sense of the word, but it
affects the ratio between the demand for labor and its supply. That
increased demand drives up wages so people can not only pay
their rent more easily, but can more easily purchase goods
and services from one another. After all, it is not merely the
glaziers and the policemen who are enriched by payments from the
landlord, those whom policeman and the glazier patronize, and the
people those people patronize, etc. Money
circulates among laborers, enabling all of them to profit from serving
one another until the landlord takes that money back out of circulation.
Thus we see that, even in terms of price inflation, rents fell and
wages climbed tremendously after the San Francisco Earthquake and the
Chicago Fire. There was not only full employment, but very gainful
employment as laborers no longer had to bid one another down to find
work.
Even the Black Death led to more prosperous tenants, as it reduced the
number of peasants competing for land and thereby reduced rents and
raised wages in relation to prices:
The landlord's discomfort ultimately benefited
the
peasantry. Lower
prices for foodstuffs and greater purchasing power from the last
quarter of the
fourteenth century onward, progressive disintegration of demesnes, and
waning
customary land tenure enabled the enterprising, ambitious peasant to
lease or
purchase property and become a substantial landed proprietor. The
average size
of the peasant holding grew in the late Middle Ages. Due to the
peasant's
generally improved standard of living, the century and a half following
the magna pestilencia has been labeled a "golden age" in which the most
successful peasant became a "yeoman" or "kulak" within the village
community. Freed from
labor service, holding a fixed copyhold lease, and enjoying greater
disposable income, the peasant exploited his land exclusively for his
personal benefit and
often pursued leisure and some of the finer things in life. Consumption
of
meat by England's humbler social strata rose substantially after the
Black
Death, a shift in consumer tastes that reduced demand for grain and
helped make
viable the shift toward pastoralism in the countryside. Late medieval
sumptuary legislation, intended to keep the humble from dressing above
his
station and retain the distinction between low— and highborn,
attests
both to the peasant's greater income and the desire of the elite to
limit disorienting social
change (Dyer,
1989; Gottfried, 1983; Hunt and Murray, 1999).
Now, I am not advocating window-breaking any more
than I am advocating earthquakes, fires, floods or Black Death. What I
am saying is that one cannot make
assumptions about the distribution of wealth being some kind of natural
phenomenon
where land is monopolized. Monopoly interferes with the natural
distribution of
wealth, and the laws of production are
subordinate to the laws of distribution.
That is, people produce in order to either consume or acquire
privileges. When some use privilege to pile up more and more
obligations than they
care to consume, others are thereby shackled by a lack of opportunity
to
produce and are left unable
to afford consuming much at all. This in turn stifles production.
Failure to take
this into consideration leads to conclusions that sound right but don't
correlate
to the evidence.
Yes, breaking a window to repair it is needless waste, but so is
barring unemployed people from access to land and natural resources on
which and with which they might produce useful things.
This is not a phenomenon that applies only to landlords and
tenants,
either. It similarly impacts debtors when lenders keep
accumulating money to lend, or when owners of licensed monopolies
(railroads, public utility companies, etc.) keep accumulating more
monopolies from the proceeds of overcharging the people. All of these
privileges invite accumulation of unused
purchasing power in the hands of privilege, and thereby reduce the
purchasing power of those who actually produce wealth.
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